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Recommendations to Optimize the Safety of Elective Surgical Care While Limiting the Spread of COVID-19: Primum Non Nocere

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Abstract: COVID-19 has drastically altered our lives in an unprecedented manner, shuttering industries and leaving most of the country in isolation as we adapt to the evolving crisis. Orthopedic surgery has not been spared from these effects, with the postponement of elective procedures in an attempt to mitigate disease transmission and preserve hospital resources as the pandemic continues to expand. During these turbulent times, it is crucial to understand that although patients' and care-providers' safety is paramount, canceling or postponing essential surgical care is not without consequences and may be irreversibly detrimental to patients' health and quality of life in some cases. The optimal solution to how to balance effectively the resumption of standard surgical care while doing everything possible to limit the spread of COVID-19 is undetermined and could include such strategies as social distancing, screening forms and tests, including temperature screening, segregation of inpatient and outpatient teams, proper use of protective gear, and the use of ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) to provide elective, yet ultimately essential, surgical care while conserving resources and protecting the health of patients and health care providers. Of importance, these recommendations do not and should not supersede evolving United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and relevant federal, state and local public health guidelines. Level of Evidence: Level V.

he first confirmed case of COVID-19 in the United L States was reported in northern Washington on January 20 of this year. Since then, the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) has upended our society and placed an unprecedented strain on health care systems across the country.¹ Orthopedic surgery has not been spared from these drastic changes, particularly when

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88 considering the widespread cessation of elective clinical and surgical care. Most of these elective procedures 89 have been postponed in the interest of patient and 90 provider health and to address anticipated shortages in 91 staffing, beds, ventilators, and personal protective 92 equipment (PPE) as the virus rapidly spreads through 93 our communities.² This mandate effectively halted the 94 traditional clinical structure of orthopedic practices, 95 necessitating a new system for providing the highest 96 quality of orthopedic care while practicing the princi-97 ples of social distancing and preventive measures to 98 avoid the transmission of COVID-19. Although a shift 99 to telemedicine has proven instrumental in providing 100 care, questions about what is defined as an essential 101 procedure have come to the forefront. A preeminent 102 concern in this conversation is how delays in care, 103 resulting in daily pain, functional disability and un-104 bearable financial damages will affect the long-term 105 physical and mental health, employment capacity and 106 overall well-being of patients and of our economy. 107 Experiences in Hong Kong and Singapore have shown 108 that mitigation strategies, such as social distancing, 109 temperature screenings, inpatient/outpatient teams, 110 and the use of ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs), have 111 112 been effective in providing essential surgical care while

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conserving resources and protecting the health of patients and health care providers.³

115 The purpose of this investigation was to present and analyze the most up-to-date evidence available 116 concerning how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected 117 118 the orthopedic community. We present relevant 119 evidence-based literature from the 2002-2004 Severe 120 Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak. We 121 dive into the struggle between resuming state-of-the-122 art surgical care while maintaining social distancing 123 and using all precautions to limit the spread of COVID-124 19. We explore pertinent terminology, such as *elective*, 125 emergent, urgent, and essential/nonessential surgery. Last, 126 we discuss and recommend guardrails to allow the 127 continuation of best practices and high-quality patient 128 care while maintaining patient and staff safety. This 129 includes reviewing the Centers for Disease Control and 130 Prevention (CDC) recommendations, the use of 131 traditional protective gear, screening forms and tests, 132 new-technologic solutions, and more. 133

Methods

Because of the relatively recent onset of the COVID-9 outbreak, the lack of available evidence-based literature and the timeliness required to present this information, a traditional systematic review and metaanalysis would have not served the purpose well.

We performed the following systematic searches as of April 17, 2020:

142	April 17, 2020:
143	1. A systematic search of traditional databases,
144	including:
145	a. Google Scholar
146	b. PubMed
147	c. Medline
148	d. Embase.
149	2. A systematic search of online media, including:
150	a. News websites
151	b. Facebook
152	c. Twitter
152	c. Twitter

- d. Instagram
- e. Research Gate
- f. COVID-19 designated sites (John-Hopkins University Corona Virus resource center, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, etc.).

158 Keywords included combinations of the following 159 terms: "COVID-19," "Corona Virus," "Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome," and "SARS" in conjunction 160 161 with "Surgery," "Orthopedics" and "Elective/emergent/ 162 urgent procedures." Articles were screened by 4 163 independent reviewers, and relevant key information 164 was extracted, with an emphasis on information 165 regarding the 2002-2004 SARS outbreak, disease-166 spread timelines, restrictions and orders affecting 167 orthopedic patients and care-provider communities, 168 recommendations to proceed with or halt various types

of surgical care, and precautions that can be taken to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.

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Our goal was to summarize existing recommendations and considerations so as to allow orthopedic care providers to manage orthopedic patients safely during the COVID-19 pandemic.

What Can We Learn from the 2002-2004 SARS Outbreak?

When looking into the future, we can use lessons 179 from the past. Perhaps the only real evidence-based 180 literature available to date is from the Severe Acute 181 Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002-2004, 182 caused by SARS-CoV.⁴ Although there are many 183 obvious significant differences between the 2 out-184 breaks, this is perhaps the most recent similar experi-185 ence humanity has had to endure, and we can 186 definitely learn from it. Notably, the SARS outbreak 187 was controlled (or it subsided) in the absence of so-188 phisticated diagnostic tests, effective therapies or a 189 vaccine.⁵ The success of eliminating the outbreak was 190 attributed to a multifaceted approach that included 191 192 isolation of suspected cases, contact tracing, quarantine 193 of potentially exposed individuals, provision of PPE and training for health care workers, establishment of fever 194 clinics, and enhanced communication efforts for health 195 care professionals, policymakers and the public.⁵ 196 Studies have shown that during the SARS outbreak, 197 198 22% of all persons affected in Hong Kong and 43% of 199 all affected persons in Toronto were health care workers.⁶ Li et al. studied SARS infection among health 200 care professionals in Beijing, China, during the 2002-201 2004 SARS outbreak. They found that among the 770 202health care workers who had contact with patients who 203 204 had SARS, 2.43% (N = 18) were found to be infected 205 with the virus. Importantly, no transmission was reported among hospital staff. They also reported that 206 there was no use of negative pressure or N95 masks in 207their facilities and that simple protective measures and 208 strictly enforced safety protocols were sufficient to 209 control the in-hospital spread of SARS.⁷ Although Li 210 et al. did not deem the use of N95 masks and negative-211 pressure isolation rooms necessary, the Canadian 212 experience reported that the following protective 213 measures were recommended: the use of negative-214 pressure isolation rooms, where available; N95 or 215 higher levels of respiratory protection; gloves, gowns 216 and eve protection; and careful hand hygiene.⁸ Simple 217 PPE was also found to be effective in a systematic 218 review performed by Jefferson et al. and published in 219 2007.⁹ Chu et al. investigated the impact of SARS on 220 hospital performance in Taipei, Taiwan.¹⁰ Thev 221 reported the average monthly number of outpatient 222 223 visits at base year was $52,317 \pm 4204$. Outpatient visits 224 for the year SARS emerged and 1 year and 2 years later

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225 were 55%, 82% and 84%, respectively. Orthopedic 226 surgery was 1 of the outpatient departments that had 227 not recovered by the fourth year after the SARS 228 outbreak, with an estimated 84% of outpatient visits 229 from baseline. Schull et al. reported that the rate of 230 elective surgery in Toronto fell by 22% and 15% during 231 the early and late restriction periods, respectively, and 232 by 8% in the comparison regions (Ottawa and London, 233 Ontario).¹¹

234 COVID-19 shares 70%-80% of its genome with 235 SARS-CoV; both have relatively similar aerosol and 236 surface stability are transmitted by droplets and contact 237 with infected persons and surfaces, and both target the receptor.^{12,13} 238 angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 239 Although the COVID-19 transmission rate seems to be 240 much higher, the fatality rate is estimated to be less 241 than 2.3% and perhaps much lower. In comparison, 242 SARS-CoV and Middle East respiratory syndrome 243 (MERS)-CoV have a reported case fatality rate of 9.6% and 35%, respectively.^{12,14} 244

245 A higher transmission rate may be related to inherent 246 viral properties but also may, in part, be attributed to 247 globalization, frequent air travel, and other changes in 248 social habits that have occurred since 2004. A lower 249 case fatality rate may also be attributed to inherent viral 250 characteristics. Other contributing factors may include 251 the improvement of health care services and protective 252 equipment and other significant protective measures 253 taken worldwide.

254 In summary, the 2002-2004 SARS outbreak teaches 255 us that health care workers are at high risk and that PPE 256 and its proper use are essential. It is of concern that the 257 current pandemic may re-emerge next winter and that 258 recovery of health care services may take several years 259 or longer. 260

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Review of the National and Regional Guidelines

264 By the time the World Health Organization declared 265 COVID-19 a global pandemic, on March 11, it was 266 apparent that the virus would place substantial strain on health care infrastructure and supplies throughout 267 268 the country in the following days and weeks.¹⁵ To meet 269 these challenges, on March 13, the American College of 270 Surgeons put forth the first recommendations con-271 cerning elective care during this crisis. They recom-272 mended that each surgeon "thoughtfully review all 273 scheduled elective procedures with a plan to minimize, 274 postpone, or cancel electively scheduled operations." 275 They also stated that this recommendation should be in 276 place until we have passed the anticipated inflection 277 point of virus exposure and can reliably support a rapid uptick in patients' critical-care needs.¹⁶ This statement 278 279 was quickly supported by the U.S. Surgeon General and 280 followed-up by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid

Services, which provided a tiered framework to follow when considering elective medical services.^{17,18} The 3 tiers, which are based upon acuity, are a guide to which 284 procedures are appropriate to be conducted at this time 285 and which should be postponed. In general, they recommended that surgeons limit all nonessential planned surgeries until further notice.¹⁷ Notably, initial recommendations were considered in the context of a global crisis and did not contemplate differences in local or regional disease burden.

Following these initial recommendations, most of the 291 country's local hospital policies regarding elective sur-292 293 gical care have been guided by individual states' recommendations. At the time of this writing, 35 states 294 and the District of Columbia have issued individual 295 296 statements or policies pertaining to elective-care restrictions.¹⁹ However, the recommendations have been 297 dynamic and varied, with differing definitions of elec-298 tive procedures and rare references to orthopedic 299 practices in particular.²⁰ As such, individual institutions 300 have been responsible for determining which ortho-301 pedic surgeries should be performed or postponed as 302 303 they navigate the pandemic. Similarly, most discussions 304 related to surgery policies initially pertained to the 305 performance of surgery in a hospital or inpatient setting where the disease burden is greatest and resource 306 availability is most challenged. 307

The many recommendations put forth raise some 308 309 essential considerations as orthopedic surgeons adjust 310 to the likely long-term impact that COVID-19 will have on surgical care. In this early period, with thousands of 311 deaths occurring each day and health systems still un-312 der extreme stress, the decision to postpone elective 313 procedures and allocate all resources to the crisis has 314 315 been clear. However, now that conditions have seem-316 ingly started to stabilize in certain regions, surgeons must weigh the relative risks of resuming their essential 317 elective practice while taking all possible precautions to 318 limit COVID-19's spread. This should be performed 319 only following the White House and CDC "Opening Up 320 America Again" guidelines, as well as relevant federal, 321 state and local public health guidance.²¹ Currently, the 322 resumption of elective procedures is planned to proceed 323 324 during Phase I of the 3-phase approach of the "Opening 325 Up America Again" initiative.

Moving Forward

The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the 328 University of Washington is supplying up-to-date pro-329 330 jections of COVID-19, including deaths per day, total deaths and hospital resource use.²² The projections take 331 332 into account the stay-at-home order, the closure of education facilities and nonessential services and severe 333 travel limitations, all implemented on different dates in 334 335 different states. Although the projections change with 336 time, it appears that the outbreak has already peaked in

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337 many states and that many states will not sustain a 338 deficit in hospital resources.

339 These projections support the motion to lift the ban, 340 responsibly and gradually, on essential elective surgery 341 worldwide. Lifting the constraints should not be done 342 carelessly, and many factors should be taken into ac-343 count, including the regional health care resources 344 available and the projection of a peak in transmissions 345 and deaths in specific geographic regions. The 346 resumption of shoulder, knee and ankle arthroscopies 347 (and other orthopedics procedures requiring ≤ 23 348 hours of hospital stay) in Singapore can be used as an example.²³ 349

350 Consistent with the need to provide additional 351 essential services, the White House and the CDC are 352 currently supporting the reopening of elective surgery 353 during Phase I. This support also includes social 354 distancing, return to work in stages, resumption of 355 elective surgeries, and the opening of gyms, while 356 schools and organized youth activities will remain 357 closed.

358 It also proposes the formulation of region-specific 359 plans for how to operationally resume the practice of patient care as well as how to survive financially during 360 these turbulent times.²⁴⁻²⁶ Private practices, hospitals 361 362 and health care systems (similar to other small and 363 large businesses) are in jeopardy. With elective surgery 364 constituting upwards of 47% of orthopedic-care 365 spending,² essential medical practices may default, 366 resulting in irreparable long-term damage to public 367 health.

368 Many new surgical management algorithms are 369 circulating, and though there are some differences, 370 most algorithms agree with the following criteria for 371 performing essential surgery without further delay^{21,27,28}. 372

- Locations where the outbreak has most likely peaked
- Downward trajectory of > 14 days in regional symptomatic and confirmed cases
- No shortage of resources, including:
 - Staff

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- Beds
- PPE
- Ventilators
- Patients who are healthy and asymptomatic.
- Q1 • ASA (American Society of Anesthesiologists) 1-2

Patients must understand the possibility of an addi-384 tional risk that is entailed by undergoing surgery during 385 the COVID-19 outbreak and must provide written 386 informed consent that speaks to the necessity and the 387 risks and benefits of receiving care at this time. In 388 addition, the surgical management algorithms should 389 be considered in the context of hospital-based inpatient 390 procedures on the one hand and outpatient-based 391 procedures commonly conducted in ASCs. 392

Initially, ASCs are perhaps the best facilities to be used 393 394 in this setting because most do not include emergency departments that typically admit elderly patients with 395 396 infectious diseases and/or severe comorbidities. More-397 over, most are currently vacant and have not been transitioned to receive patients with COVID-19 because 398 in most states, there was no need to do so, to date. 399 400

We should remember that when removing these constraints, it will be critical to track any suspicion of a local surge in infections and immediately contain the local outbreak by all means, including immediate reporting to all relevant authorities.

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Definition of Types of Surgery

406 One key consideration is the distinction between 407 essential and nonessential surgery. Initial recommen-408 dations in mid-March in the United States were focused 409 primarily on managing disease burden, such that the 410 hospital system in general would not be overwhelmed 411 in terms of available resources, including PPE, ventila-412 tors and manpower. In addition, the benefits of miti-413 gation and social distancing were emphasized to meet 414 that same goal. Thus, "elective surgery" was deter-415 mined to be "nonessential." Subsequently, discussions 416 ensued that related to activities that are essential, with 417 "emergent" procedures being the most clearly defined. 418 Interchangeably, the terms, including "urgent," were 419 used often when referring to conditions that, if left 420 untreated over some subsequent period of time (i.e., 4-421 6 weeks), the outcome of neglecting that condition 422 would have a negative impact on the patient's condi-423 tion. Urgent conditions would implicitly include those 424 that are also considered emergent conditions, but 425 arguably, there is latitude, depending on tangible and 426 intangible considerations, to discuss what other condi-427 tions would fall into the urgent category. The 4-6 week 428 time line was essentially based on expectations of a 429 greater clarity related to changes in disease burden and 430 the effects of mitigation and social distancing, with 431 some additional insights into the timing and duration of 432 stay-at-home orders. Notably, these same discussions 433 have evolved to consider local demands concerning the 434 disease burden on the hospital system rather than the 435 global impact of the disease state on the entire hospital 436 or medical system. 437

Some states have provided additional guidance. The 438 Illinois Department of Public Health, for example, 439 defined elective procedures as those that are pre-440 planned by both the patient and the physician and are 441 advantageous to the patient but are not urgent or 442 emergent. As such, sports medicine and orthopedic 443 procedures in many institutions during this crisis have 444 been limited to those thought to be urgent or emergent, 445 such as acute tendon injury, ligamentous tears, bucket-446 handle meniscus tears with a locked knee, intra-447 articular loose bodies causing acute symptoms, acute 448 ARTICLE IN PRESS COMMENTARY

449 fracture management, dislocated joints that cannot be 450 closed-reduced, and infected joints, among several 451 others. Expansion of these definitions, which are rela-452 tively easy to define as emergent conditions requiring 453 relatively immediate treatment (as a class of essential 454 services), has included discussions related to condi-455 tions that are urgent (short of being emergent), 456 whereby surgical intervention is required to otherwise 457 avoid worsening the condition should surgery be 458 delayed. Related to this is the further consideration 459 that pain, dysfunction and loss of occupation can 460 relate to the concept of urgency for an individual 461 patient and, thus, essential provision of timely care 462 may be indicated.

463 Other states have provided guidance concerning 464 what to consider as essential or nonessential for the 465 discretion of licensed providers. In Ohio, for example, 466 nonessential surgery is defined as a procedure that 467 can be delayed without undue risk to the current or 468 future health of a patient. However, in areas where 469 resources are available and health systems are adequately equipped to handle an uptick in COVID-470 471 19 cases, it may be appropriate to broaden the defi-472 nition of essential procedures. As an example, 473 outpatient hip, knee and shoulder arthroscopies 474 produce little burden on hospital resources and can be 475 reliably performed at outpatient ambulatory surgery 476 centers.²³ In these cases, postponing care may need-477 lessly prolong patient pain, disability and loss of 478 occupation.

479 Although most would agree on what is an urgent or 480 emergent orthopedic condition requiring surgical 481 intervention, broadening the definition of essential 482 surgery may be more difficult and subjective. Further-483 more, practice patterns today will probably be in place 484 for the foreseeable future and "living with COVID" will 485 continue to guide our policies and procedures.

486 Our institution (Midwest Orthopaedics at Rush 487 University Medical Center) has implemented the 488 following definitions of urgent surgery to be per-489 formed in a limited capacity in the ASC system that 490 are not necessarily considered emergent but, rather, 491 urgent and, thus, essential based on relevant clinical 492 parameters. Ultimately, decisions may be multifacto-493 rial and made with board oversight and comprehen-494 sive documentation and may depend on local 495 resource demands, downward changes in the disease burden and federal and local policies.²⁹ These factors 496 497 might include: 498

- 1. Conditions that without treatment could result in 499 compromised outcomes 500
- 2. A condition that has failed to respond to nonsurgical 501 care 502
- 3. Neurologic deficits and/or progressive neurologic 503 deterioration 504

Table 1. Recommended Precautions and Actions: The Patient

- Age < 65 years old; may consider healthy older patients (American Society of Anestheiologists [ASA] 1 on a case-by-case b_{8} 507 basis ASA 1-2; may consider ASA 3 if necessary and approved by
- anesthesiologist or medical director. Has no influenza-like symptoms (ILI):
 - Fever 100.4° or greater
 - Cough
 - Shortness of breath ٠ • Malaise
- Has no other risk factors, such as recent travel, sick family member or COVID-19 exposure.
- Has signed a specific COVID-19 consent form
- Was tested for fever on admission
- Must wear PPE, including surgical mask, gown and gloves
- Was tested for COVID-19 within 72 hours prior to surgery (once tests are readily available)²⁶ Preferably, tests should be conducted 24 hours or fewer prior to surgery. Current tests include:
- Detection test: reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
- Antibody test: enzyme-linked Immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
- Has 1, or preferably no, accompanying family member
- Has wrist band to verify screening completion
- 4. Conditions with intolerable pain, especially when narcotics are required
- 5. Functional losses precluding return to activities, including activities of daily living
- 6. Conditions resulting in significant financial hardship.

Protective Measures

In contemplating living with COVID-19, we must assume that the protective measures we implement today may remain with us for years to come. Jefferson et al. demonstrated that routine long-term implementation of PPE to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses is effective, and many simple and low-cost interventions could be useful in reducing their spread.9

Tables 1-5 list precautions and actions that may limit transmission, protect patients and health care providers

 Table 2. Recommended Precautions and Actions: The Staff

- Hand hygiene is key.
- Staff should keep social distancing (minimum 6-foot distance when possible) and use personal protective equipment (gloves, gown, surgical mask, and goggles). Intubation should be performed with only the necessary staff in
- the operating room, wearing N95 masks and eye protection.
- Delays between room re-entrance by necessary staff and between cases.
- Minimize staffing as much as possible.
- Test all staff for COVID-19 on arrival or before (once tests are readily available).
- Wear wrist band to verify screening completion.
- Staff should be trained in protecting themselves and patients. 558 Provide supportive measures to address staff fatigue and 559 emotional distress. 560

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Table 3. Recommended Precautions and Actions: Facility andRegion	Table 5. R Postoperati
 Each geographic region and facilities within it must assess the availability of the following and proceed accordingly if a shortage occurs or is expected³²: Personal protective equipment supply Staffing Beds (specifically, intensive care unit beds) Ventilators 	Should inclu - Minimiz - Use tele - Impleme - Use tech - Provide and elec
- Medications, anesthetics and all surgical supplies Facilities should implement the following:	
 Elevator management to minimize crowding of patients and staff Operating/procedural rooms must meet engineering and Facility Guideline Institute standards for air exchanges. Protocols for managing and isolating patients and staff suspected of or confirmed to have COVID-19 infection Case prioritization strategy is set in place. Data should be collected as proposed by the American College of Surgeons in order to reassess policies and procedures frequently. 	failure to versibly de life. Wheth whether t whether a unknown. find ways medical an tive measu
 Other regional considerations include²⁶: A sustained reduction in COVID-19 cases for ≥ 14 days Access for COVID-19 testing Availability of active monitoring of confirmed or suspected cases and their contacts 	

and allow the resumption of essential surgical services.³⁰⁻³²

Limitations

588 A significant limitation of all studies investigating as-589 pects of the COVID-19 pandemic is the lack of 590 evidence-based, trustworthy resources. This study is 591 unique in its attempt to analyze studies performed 592 following the 2002-2004 SARS outbreak, but recent 593 literature concerning the COVID-19 pandemic is mostly 594 Level V evidence. Moreover, because of the rapidly 595 unfolding reality we are facing, this article, like many 596 others pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic, may not 597 be relevant within a few weeks or even a few days. 598

Summary

"First, do no harm" is embedded in our core as health care providers in addition to the privilege to help those in need. We must limit all unnecessary activities to mitigate the harmful effects of this pandemic. At the same time, we must remember that in our profession,

Table 4. Recommended Precautions and Actions: Surgery

- Same-day preoperative admissions are preferred (rather than a dav before).
- Updated preoperative checklists with questions pertaining to COVID-19
- Surgical times should be kept short.
- 612 - Limited number of operations per operation room block
- Limit operating room traffic 613
- Disinfect the operating room strictly. 614
 - Additional room turnover delay as necessary
- 615 Expedited postoperative recovery and discharge procedures 616

ecommended Precautions and Actions: ve Management de the use of the following if possible:

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- e face-to-face consultation. medicine and telerehabilitation.³² ent wearable sensors.^{33,34}
 - nology-assisted rehabilitation.^{32,35,36}
- patient guidance regarding adequate nutrition, hydration trolyte balance.

act and provide essential care can be irreetrimental to patients' health and quality of her the COVID-19 outbreak is close to an end, he outbreak will reemerge next winter, and nother contagious pathogen will appear are However, it is clear that we must adapt and to resume our lives and provide high-quality nd surgical care while using the best protecares available to protect our patients and staff. 🤷

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